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n the last few years, the Supreme Court has undertaken a radical 
change in its approach to pleading standards. The watershed event 
was the Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,1 in which 
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the Court articulated a new “plausibility” pleading standard under 
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under the Court’s 
plausibility standard, the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint must be 
both nonconclusory and “plausible”—i.e., the allegations must not 
only be “consistent with” the defendant’s liability, but must go 
beyond mere consistency to supplant alternative explanations for 
challenged conduct that would result in nonliability.  The Court’s 
recent articulation of the plausibility standard has been the subject of 
significant academic commentary, as well as the focus of a series of 
judicial decisions grappling with the exact scope of the doctrine.2  It is 
in this context that the Court decided, once again, to enter the fray and 
further articulate the standards that govern pleading in the federal 
courts. 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 the Court went even further than it had in 
Twombly in giving teeth to the notice pleading standard in Rule 8(a).4  
This time, the Court focused on the requirement under Rule 8(a) that 
allegations be “nonconclusory.”  In doing so, the Supreme Court 
articulated a theory that invites even greater judicial scrutiny at the 
pleading stage.  In discussing this prong of the analysis, the majority 
made clear that conclusory allegations are not entitled to the normal 
assumption of truth accorded factual allegations in deciding a motion 
to dismiss and that, in order to avoid the conclusory label, a plaintiff 
must plead specific facts that support the plaintiff’s more general 
allegations.  Simply asserting ultimate conclusions that, if accepted as 
true, would support liability is not enough. 
Iqbal thus represents a further raising of the bar plaintiffs must 
meet before they are allowed to proceed with discovery.  As in 
 
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2 See, e.g., Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Courts in and out 
of the Sixth Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have 
indicated that its holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that 
considered in Twombly.”); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 
315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he exact parameters of the Twombly decision are not yet 
known . . . .”); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008); Anderson v. 
Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the wake of Twombly, courts 
and commentators have been grappling with the decision’s meaning and reach.”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (2008) 
(maintaining that under Twombly, the notice pleading rules had been “decidedly tightened 
(if not discarded) in favor of a stricter standard”); Linda S. Mullenix, Troubling 
“Twombly,” NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 13 (arguing that Twombly is “a surprising 
departure from ingrained federal pleading rules”). 
3 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
4 FED R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
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Twombly, the Court reiterated that its articulation of the pleading 
standard was dictated by the text of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Nonetheless, the Court also noted that its ruling would 
have significant practical implications.  As in Twombly, the Court 
cited the dangers of allowing plaintiffs with weak claims to proceed 
with discovery, given the burdens the process frequently places on 
defendants.  Allowing such cases to proceed is not only inefficient 
and costly, but may result in settlements that are not warranted by the 
merits.  Iqbal thus represents a logical progression in the march 
toward greater judicial scrutiny at the outset of litigation to avoid the 
inefficiencies and burdens that may be imposed on defendants later in 
the process.  The ruling is likely to have a sweeping effect on the 
ability of plaintiffs to pursue their claims beyond the pleading stage, 
potentially revolutionizing federal civil practice.5 
The Court’s recent pleading decisions recognize that, as the costs 
of litigation increase and the scope of discovery expands, the need for 
more stringent pleading standards increases.  It is neither efficient nor 
fair to allow claims of dubious merit to proceed when doing so may 
lead to settlements that are not based on the underlying merits, but 
rather the potential costs associated with defending a lawsuit in our 
modern civil justice system.  Iqbal thus presents a further evolution in 
the pleading standard that is likely to increase the efficiency and 
fairness of modern civil practice.  At the same time, it is a decision 
that is consistent with the text of Rule 8, giving effect to language that 
in the past had often lain dormant. 
 
5 See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
Twombly’s plausibility standard was “a significant change, with broad-reaching 
implications”); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Few 
issues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which 
are the key that opens access to courts.”); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and 
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875 (2009) (“Many judges and 
academic commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice 
pleading practice, and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the ‘liberal ethos’ of the 
Federal Rules, favoring decisions ‘on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through 
discovery.’”); Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 878–79 (2008) (arguing that Twombly changed the 
law dramatically, “put[ting] an end to notice pleading as it has been understood in the 
seventy years since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Robert L. 
Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35 A.B.A. LITIG. 1, 2 (Spring 2009) 
(“Iqbal drastically changed the landscape for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.”); see also Courie v. 
Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal “raised the bar for pleading requirements beyond the 
old ‘no-set-of-facts’ standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 . . . (1957)”). 
 1056 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 1053 
Part I of this Article discusses the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Iqbal.  Justice Kennedy’s decision for the majority provides a 
strong statement of the requirement that pleadings not be 
“conclusory,” going so far as to hold that such conclusory allegations 
are not entitled to the normal assumption of truthfulness.  In 
articulating this requirement, the majority invites lower courts to look 
closely at the representations in the complaint to determine whether 
they are grounded in fact or they are mere assertions.  The majority’s 
decision thus provides a powerful basis for lower courts to dismiss 
complaints that are unsupported and has the potential to effect a 
sweeping change in the ability of plaintiffs to survive the pleading 
stage, without at least alleging some specific facts that would support 
their ultimate conclusions.  The potentially sweeping nature of the 
majority’s ruling was recognized in the dissent written by Justice 
Souter, who was the architect of the Twombly decision.  As the 
dissent observed, Iqbal goes beyond the principles articulated in 
Twombly.  The Iqbal decision thus promises to fulfill the evolution 
the Court began in Twombly. 
Part II addresses the ways in which Iqbal supplements the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Twombly.  Twombly presents a significant 
reinterpretation of traditional notice pleading standards as articulated 
in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Court 
articulated a standard that requires a more stringent scrutiny of the 
pleadings, which is “even more favorable to dismissal of a 
complaint.”6  Under Twombly, the factual allegations contained in a 
complaint must be “plausible.”7  The decision thus requires that the 
allegations go beyond mere consistency with liability and demonstrate 
that, if accepted as true, the defendant is in fact liable.  As the Court 
made clear, the mere “possibility” that a plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief is not enough.  In this way, the standard imposes what might be 
characterized as a logical coherence requirement.8  The allegations in 
the complaint must be both necessary and sufficient to state a claim.  
While the Court mentioned that the allegations in the complaint also 
must be nonconclusory,9 the decision did not address this requirement 
in detail under the Federal Rules. 
 
6 Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). 
7 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
8 See generally Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063 
(2009). 
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. 
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This is where the Court’s decision in Iqbal provides additional 
guidance, supplementing and strengthening the requirements under 
Rule 8(a).  The guidance the Court provided as to this 
“nonconclusory” prong of the test is likely to bar an even greater 
number of claims at the threshold pleading stage.  The Court made 
clear that ultimate conclusions must be supported by well-pled factual 
allegations.  Taken together, Iqbal and Twombly establish two bright-
line requirements that plaintiffs must meet: allegations must be both 
plausible and nonconclusory.  These twin requirements are likely to 
increase the scrutiny given to federal pleadings as well as the 
dismissal rates in the federal courts.  Moreover, they are likely to 
increase the detail in initial pleadings and the extent to which issues 
are defined at the outset of a case, which, in turn, will likely increase 
the efficiency of civil litigation in the federal courts. 
Finally, Part III discusses certain additional questions that were 
raised in the wake of Twombly that have now been put to rest in Iqbal.  
In resolving these lingering issues, the Iqbal Court consistently 
rejected attempts to limit the reach of its prior decision.  For example, 
the Court rejected the suggestion that Twombly was limited to the 
antitrust context or to complex cases.  The Court made clear that 
Twombly was based on the plain language of Rule 8, which applies 
broadly to all civil claims and is not limited to particular categories of 
cases.  Likewise, the Court rejected the notion that the ability to limit 
the scope of discovery had any role in the scrutiny that should be 
undertaken at the pleading stage.  While it is clear that the Court had a 
concern that lax pleading standards might lead to the imposition of 
unwarranted costs during discovery, the majority indicated that such 
concerns were not critical to its decision.  Accordingly, as it had in 
Twombly, the Court made clear that the pleadings must be subjected 
to heightened scrutiny whether or not discovery costs could be 
controlled through active judicial management of the discovery 
process in a particular case.  In sum, the Court rejected any attempts 
to limit or constrain the scope of its new pleading doctrine. 
The Iqbal decision is likely to have significant consequences.  
Accordingly, the debate regarding the merits and effects of the 
decision is important.  This is particularly true given recent calls for 
legislative repeal of the ruling.10  The decision presents an important 
 
10 Senator Specter recently proposed the following legislation to overrule Iqbal and 
Twombly, which provides: 
 Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the 
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evolution of pleading standards that is likely to have beneficial effects 
in terms of the efficiency of civil litigation—one that is consistent 
with the text and structure of the Federal Rules. 
I 
THE IQBAL DECISION 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”11  The Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. 
Gibson had long governed the construction of the rule, with the Court 
famously stating that a complaint must merely “give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 
it rests.”12  The Supreme Court in Twombly rejected this formulation 
as an inaccurate gloss on the rule, and in the wake of that decision, 
there was some uncertainty regarding the level of scrutiny that must 
be given to federal pleadings.13  Iqbal definitively answered that 
question, making clear that the Court understood the Federal Rules to 
require a high level of judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage in order 
to screen out cases in which plaintiffs had simply failed to plead the 
necessary facts to establish a claim. 
It was by no means clear that the Supreme Court would revisit this 
issue in Iqbal.  Questions concerning the appropriate pleading 
standard under Rule 8 were bound up with claims regarding 
governmental immunity for official acts that, independently, could 
have been dispositive in the case.  Iqbal involved a lawsuit brought by 
an individual detained after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  
Plaintiff sued former Attorney General John Ashcroft and the 
Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, alleging that plaintiff was subject 
to abuse and harsh conditions during his confinement in violation of 
his civil rights.14  His complaint asserted that these high-ranking 
officials should be held liable for these alleged violations because 
 
date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under 
rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the 
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (emphasis 
added). 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
12 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
13 See sources cited supra note 2. 
14 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009). 
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they were responsible for the policies that led to his detention.  
Specifically, Mr. Iqbal alleged that Attorney General Ashcroft and 
Director Mueller had overseen the arrest and detainment of 
“thousands of Arab Muslim men” and that “‘[t]he policy of holding 
post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by 
Defendants [Ashcroft] and [Mueller] in discussions in the weeks after 
September 11, 2001.’”15  In addition, the complaint asserted, without 
providing any supporting factual allegations, that the defendants 
“‘each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 
subject’” Mr. Iqbal to allegedly abusive conditions of confinement 
“‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, 
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”16  
Defendants moved for dismissal of these claims based both on their 
qualified immunity from suit and because the allegations in the 
complaint were insufficient to state a claim against them.  The district 
court denied the motion to dismiss, and defendants sought 
interlocutory review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.17 
In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Second Circuit found 
itself faced with a somewhat unusual situation.  While defendants’ 
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly—a decision that had the potential to revolutionize federal 
pleading standards.  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision despite the new pleading standard, suggesting that Twombly 
was limited to its context.  While the Second Circuit recognized that 
Twombly had overturned the prior formulation articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson,18 adopting a standard that 
required that allegations contained in a plaintiff’s complaint be 
“plausible,” the court imposed limitations on the Twombly doctrine, 
arguing that it was dependent upon the “context” in which the claims 
 
15 Id. at 1944 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 
47, 69, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1809 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 
Complaint]). 
16 Id. (alteration in source) (quoting Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 96). 
17 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). 
18 Id. at 155 (“[T]he Court’s explanation for its holding indicated that it intended to 
make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had prevailed in the 
federal courts ever since Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 . . . (1957) . . . .”). 
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arose and that, in particular, Twombly was most applicable to complex 
cases in which discovery was likely to be extensive.19 
However, by the court’s own admission, its decision was premised 
on uncertainty regarding the test articulated in Twombly.  According 
to the court, Twombly created “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning 
the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings.”20  The court 
attempted to fill this void.  At the outset, it rejected many of the 
limitations the plaintiff sought to impose on Twombly, noting that “it 
would be cavalier to believe that the Court’s rejection of the ‘no set of 
facts’ language from Conley . . . applies only to section 1 antitrust 
claims.”21  However, at the same time, the court imposed a similar 
limitation—one couched in the rubric of “context”—to suggest that 
the Twombly rule was not a general one, but rather was dependent on 
context. 
In support of this theory, the court claimed that the Supreme Court 
had sent “conflicting signals” by applying the “fair notice” 
formulation of the pleading rule in a pro se case, Erickson v. 
Pardus,22 “just two weeks after issuing its opinion in Bell Atlantic.”23  
In addition, the court cited the oft-referenced Form 9 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which, it asserted, supported the notion that 
a complaint with only “generalized allegation[s] of negligence” was 
adequate to survive a motion to dismiss “as long as the defendant is 
given notice of the date, time, and place where the legally vulnerable 
conduct occurred.”24  Finally, the court cited the concerns expressed 
by the Twombly majority regarding the cost of discovery as 
“provid[ing] some basis for believing that whatever adjustment in 
pleading standards results from Bell Atlantic is limited to cases where 
massive discovery is likely to create unacceptable settlement 
pressures.”25  Having circumscribed the holding of Twombly, the 
court ruled that it did not bar the plaintiff’s claims. 
 
19 See id. at 157–58 (“[Twombly articulated] a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which 
obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where 
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”). 
20 Id. at 155. 
21 Id. at 157 n.7. 
22 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
23 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). 
24 Id. at 156. 
25 Id. at 157. 
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A.  The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the Second Circuit’s attempt to 
limit Twombly.  While the majority acknowledged that “the pleading 
standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual 
allegations,” it made clear that “[the standard] demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”26  “A 
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ . . . Nor does a 
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further 
factual enhancement.’’”27 
The majority reiterated Twombly’s plausibility standard, observing 
that the plausibility requirement “asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”28  “Where a 
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 
of ‘entitlement to relief.’”29 
The majority made clear that this plausibility standard was not 
limited to particular kinds of cases, as the Second Circuit’s analysis 
had suggested, but rather applied more broadly.  While the majority 
acknowledged that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense,”30 this did not mean that the 
plausibility standard was limited to certain kinds of cases. 
However, the majority did not merely reaffirm the plausibility 
standard; it went much further, articulating its view of what it termed 
a second “working principle” under Rule 8—i.e., the requirement that 
allegations not be “conclusory.”  The majority observed that Rule 8 
“does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”31  “While legal conclusions can 
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by 
factual allegations.”32 
 
26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 Id. (alteration in source) (citation omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
30 Id. at 1950. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Accordingly, the majority outlined a two-step process for lower 
courts to follow in assessing the allegations in a complaint.  First, the 
court must determine which allegations in the complaint are 
conclusory and, therefore, are not entitled to the assumption of 
truthfulness normally accorded to allegations in a complaint when 
ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.  Second, the court must 
proceed to consider the remaining factual allegations, assuming them 
to be true, and determine whether they state a “plausible” claim for 
relief: 
 In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to 
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because 
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.  While legal conclusions can provide the 
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 
allegations.  When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.33 
The majority found that the allegations in Mr. Iqbal’s complaint 
were insufficient because they constituted “bare assertions” linking 
Attorney General Ashcroft and Director Mueller to the challenged 
conduct.34  Such bare assertions, the majority noted, were “not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.”35  Rather, the majority concluded 
that they should not be considered in determining whether plaintiff 
had pleaded sufficient allegations under Rule 8. 
Having excluded several of plaintiff’s allegations as conclusory, 
the majority found that plaintiff’s complaint did not meet the 
plausibility requirement.  The majority observed that the allegations 
in plaintiff’s complaint were “consistent with” a plan to purposefully 
detain individuals as a result of their race, religion, or national 
origin.36  However, the majority concluded that there were “more 
likely explanations” for the policies cited in the complaint and thus 
plaintiff had not “plausibly establish[ed]” the discriminatory purpose 
necessary to state a claim for relief.37 
Specifically, the majority concluded that the federal government’s 
detention policies after the September 11 attacks were “likely lawful 
and justified by [officials’] nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1951. 
35 Id. at 1950. 
36 Id. at 1951. 
37 Id. 
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who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential 
connections to those who committed terrorist acts”: 
 The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim 
hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al 
Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group.  Al Qaeda was headed by 
another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and composed in large 
part of his Arab Muslim disciples.  It should come as no surprise 
that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and 
detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks 
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, 
even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs 
nor Muslims.  On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller 
oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory 
intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United 
States and who had potential connections to those who committed 
terrorist acts.  As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for 
the arrests, . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination 
respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible 
conclusion.38 
Moreover, the majority found that the complaint did not contain 
allegations plausibly demonstrating that defendants had “purposefully 
housed detainees” under harsh considerations “due to their race, 
religion, or national origin.”39  Rather, the majority concluded that 
“[a]ll [the complaint] plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law 
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, 
sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions 
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”40  
Accordingly, the majority concluded that the complaint failed to 
satisfy both requirements under Rule 8.41 
 
38 Id. at 1951–52 (citation omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 
567 (2007)). 
39 Id. at 1952. 
40 Id. 
41 The majority rejected the plaintiff’s contention that these allegations were adequate 
because the Federal Rules allowed plaintiff to “allege petitioners’ discriminatory intent 
‘generally.’”  Id. at 1954.  While the majority acknowledged that Rule 9(b) contained such 
language, the opinion noted: 
Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an 
elevated pleading standard.  It does not give him license to evade the less rigid—
though still operative—strictures of Rule 8. . . . And Rule 8 does not empower 
respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 
“general allegation,” and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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B.  The Dissent 
The dissent in Iqbal is notable in several respects.  First, the dissent 
authored by former Justice Souter, the author of the Twombly 
majority opinion, is significant because it makes clear that Iqbal went 
far beyond Twombly.42  In arguing that the allegations contained in 
the complaint were sufficient under Rule 8, the dissent found 
dispositive the fact that the complaint alleged that Attorney General 
Ashcroft and Director Mueller “knew of and condoned” the detention 
policy, and indeed “affirmatively acted to create” the policy: 
The complaint . . . alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and 
Mueller knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their 
subordinates carried out.  Actually, the complaint goes further in 
alleging that Ashcroft and Muller [sic] affirmatively acted to create 
the discriminatory detention policy.  If these factual allegations are 
true, Ashcroft and Mueller were, at the very least, aware of the 
discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately 
indifferent to it.43 
The dissent believed that the majority misapplied Twombly by 
engaging in an assessment of the probability that these allegations 
were true, as compared to alternative explanations.  According to the 
dissent, “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.  
We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the 
allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.”44 
The dissent focused on the majority’s analysis with respect to the 
allegations in the complaint that the majority found conclusory, 
noting both that it did not “understand the majority to disagree with 
th[e] understanding of ‘plausibility’ under Twombly” and that it 
“agree[d] that the two allegations selected by the majority, standing 
alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to relief for unconstitutional 
discrimination.”45  The dissent disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusions that the remaining allegations in the complaint, which the 
dissent believed did set out a “plausible” basis for liability, were no 
more than “bare assertions”: 
 
42 Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 1959. 
44 Id.  The dissent, however, noted: “The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations 
that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, 
or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”  Id. 
45 Id. at 1960. 
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The fallacy of the majority’s position . . . lies in looking at the 
relevant assertions in isolation.  The complaint contains specific 
allegations that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the 
Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section and 
the Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the FBI’s New York Field 
Office implemented a policy that discriminated against Arab 
Muslim men, including Iqbal, solely on account of their race, 
religion, or national origin. . . . Viewed in light of these subsidiary 
allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as 
“conclusory” are no such thing.  Iqbal’s claim is not that Ashcroft 
and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject” him to a discriminatory practice that is left 
undefined; his allegation is that “they knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a particular, 
discrete, discriminatory policy detailed in the complaint.  Iqbal does 
not say merely that Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous 
discrimination, or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined 
constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to create the 
discriminatory policy he has described.46 
The dissent argued that such allegations were more than enough to 
give defendants “fair notice” of the claims against them and thus to 
satisfy the pleading standards of Rule 8.  Accordingly, the dissent 
would have found that such allegations were not conclusory and, 
considering the complaint as a whole, would have found that it stated 
a plausible claim for relief. 
Second—and somewhat paradoxically—the dissent is also notable 
for the common ground shared with the majority.  Other than its 
disagreement with the majority’s application of the plausibility 
standard and determinations regarding whether plaintiff’s allegations 
were conclusory, the dissent was remarkably silent with respect to the 
general propositions laid out in the majority’s opinion.  The dissent 
did not disagree, for example, that conclusory allegations were not 
entitled to a presumption of truthfulness.  It did not disagree that, 
under the plausibility standard, allegations contained in a complaint 
must state more than a mere possibility that the defendants are liable.  
And it did not disagree that allegations merely “consistent with”47 
defendants’ liability were insufficient to state a claim for relief.  
Rather, the dissent was almost entirely an exercise in disputing the 
application of these general principles, which, taken by themselves, 
significantly increased the scrutiny afforded to plaintiff’s allegations 
at the pleading stage. 
 
46 Id. at 1960–61 (citation omitted). 
47 Id. at 1949 (majority opinion) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 
(2007)). 
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II 
THE EVOLUTION OF PLEADING STANDARDS: FROM TWOMBLY TO 
IQBAL 
On its face, Iqbal represents a leap from the Supreme Court’s other 
recent blockbuster decision on pleading standards, Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly.  The Twombly Court addressed a complaint filed by 
consumers alleging that local telephone carriers were conspiring to 
increase prices by preventing competitors from entering the market in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.48  The decision, authored 
by former Justice Souter, represented a landmark in the interpretation 
of Rule 8(a).  In a strong ruling joined by seven members of the 
Court, the majority held that Rule 8 requires that plaintiffs’ 
allegations be “plausible,” and that a mere possibility that the 
defendant was liable based on the allegations in the complaint was 
insufficient.  The Court reasoned that “[t]he need at the pleading stage 
for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) 
agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 
‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’”49  Applying this standard, the Court held that 
dismissal was required.50  The allegations of parallel conduct among 
the telephone companies were not sufficient to state a claim because 
the Sherman Act required that there be an actual “agreement” for 
liability to attach.51  Simply alleging that there was an agreement was 
 
48 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
49 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  
The Court also concluded that its interpretation of Rule 8(a) was consistent with prior 
precedent.  The Court pointed to Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005), where it had ruled that “something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation 
must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be allowed to ‘take up the 
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem 
increment of the settlement value.’”  Id. at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 
347). 
50 Id. at 564–65. 
51 Id. at 556–57 (“Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a 
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts 
adequate to show illegality.”); id. at 553 (“‘[T]he crucial question’ is whether the 
challenged anticompetitive conduct ‘stem[s] from independent decision or from an 
agreement, tacit or express.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. 
v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954))). 
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not enough because such allegations were “merely legal conclusions 
resting on . . . prior allegations.”52 
The Iqbal Court started with these basic principles and provided 
significant elaboration.  In the process, it markedly tightened the 
pleading standards under Rule 8(a) as compared with Twombly, which 
itself interpreted Rule 8(a) in a manner that courts and commentators 
have construed as significantly increasing the level of judicial 
scrutiny at the pleadings stage.53  Taken together, these twin decisions 
are likely to have a significant impact on federal pleading.54 
A.  The Plausibility Analysis 
The plausibility analysis is laid out fully in the Twombly opinions.  
The sweeping nature of the Twombly decision was underscored by the 
dissent, which maintained that the decision “announced a significant 
new rule” that both constituted a “stark break from precedent” and 
“fundamental[ly] . . . change[d] . . . the character of pretrial 
practice.”55  In the dissent’s view, Twombly’s majority decision 
amounted to “rewrit[ing] the Nation’s civil procedure textbooks.”56  
Nonetheless, the majority maintained that its new test was dictated by 
both the text and underlying policies of the Federal Rules.57 
 
52 Id. at 564; see also id. at 566 (noting that such allegations were fully consistent with 
conduct constituting “the natural, unilateral reaction of each [defendant] intent on keeping 
its regional dominance”). 
53 See Bone, supra note 5, at 877. 
54 Id. at 877 (arguing that “Twombly has already had a major impact,” and noting that 
the case had been “cited a startling 4000 times during the first nine months after it was 
decided”). 
55 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has announced a 
significant new rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command  
. . . .”); see also Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that Twombly “abrogated” the traditional notice pleading standard).  But see 
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) 
(observing that, even before Twombly, the “rhetoric” of notice pleading did “not match the 
reality of federal pleading practice” and that “federal courts in every circuit impose non-
Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine”); 
Spencer, supra note 2, at 432 (noting that “the Court’s move in th[e] direction [of 
plausibility pleading] is consistent with long-held sentiment among the lower federal 
courts”). 
56 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57 See id. at 555 n.3 (majority opinion). 
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1.  The Textual Foundation 
The majority decision in Twombly focused heavily on the text of 
Rule 8(a).  While the majority conceded that Rule 8(a) “requires only 
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” it maintained 
that some language in the rule placed specific and significant 
requirements on plaintiffs seeking to pursue claims in the federal 
courts.58  Specifically, the Court observed that Rule 8(a) requires that 
a plaintiff provide “‘grounds’” for the plaintiff’s alleged 
“‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”59 
Under the first element, plaintiffs must provide “not only ‘fair 
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the 
claim rests,” which means that a plaintiff’s complaint must contain 
factual allegations that actually support and explain the plaintiff’s 
theory of liability.60  Under the second element, the plaintiff must 
make factual allegations that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to 
actually establish the defendant’s liability: “The need at the pleading 
stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) 
agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 
‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’”61  These two interconnected requirements, the 
majority found, meant that a complaint must contain “[f]actual 
allegations [that are] enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”62 
The Court’s plausibility standard flowed directly from these twin 
requirements.  Under that standard, plaintiffs were required to make 
factual allegations that, if accepted as true, would dictate that there 
was more than a mere “possibility” that defendant was liable.  
Allegations that were merely consistent with the defendant’s liability 
were insufficient.  Rather, plaintiffs must provide allegations that 
nudged the complaint from mere consistency with liability to 
establishing a “plausible” case that defendants were actually liable.  
In other words, the complaint must not merely reflect an equanimity 
between liability and nonliability, but rather must contain allegations 
 
58 Id. at 555 (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
59 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). 
60 Id. at 555 n.3. 
61 Id. at 557 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). 
62 Id. at 555. 
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that were sufficient, if taken as true, to establish liability over 
plausible alternatives.63 
While the Court articulated a strong view of the role of judges in 
scrutinizing the initial pleadings, the Court did not state that the 
scrutiny applied at the initial pleading stage was without limits.  For 
example, the majority expressly disclaimed that it was imposing a 
“heightened” pleading standard such as that for pleading fraud under 
Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64  As the majority 
observed, such a requirement could “only be accomplished ‘by the 
process of amending the Federal Rules.’”65 
Nonetheless, in articulating the plausibility test, the Court broke 
from long-established precedent, “retiring” the “famous observation” 
in Conley v. Gibson that “a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”66  The majority reasoned that this no set of facts 
formulation “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, 
it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the 
allegations in the complaint.”67 
Why was it necessary to abandon this formulation?  According to 
the majority, under the Conley formulation, “a wholly conclusory 
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the 
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish 
some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”68  Such a result 
 
63 See id. at 557–58. 
64 Id. at 569 n.14 (“Here, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint were 
insufficiently ‘particular[ized],’ . . . rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it 
failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
65 Id. (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)). 
66 Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
45–46 (1957)). 
67 Id. at 563. 
68 Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46).  In contrast, the 
dissent argued that the Conley formulation should not be so lightly rejected given its long-
standing pedigree.  It maintained that, “[c]onsistent with the design of the Federal Rules, 
Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ formulation permits outright dismissal only when proceeding to 
discovery or beyond would be futile.”  Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
argued that “Conley’s language, in short, captures the policy choice embodied in the 
Federal Rules and binding on the federal courts.  We have consistently reaffirmed that 
basic understanding of the Federal Rules in the half century since Conley.”  Id. at 583;  see 
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would be inconsistent with the text of Rule 8(a), which plainly 
required that a complaint contain more than merely conclusory 
allegations.  Because of this potential problem with the literal reading 
of Conley, the majority observed that several courts had already 
rejected “taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading 
standard.”69 
2.  The Policy Implications 
While the Court did not base the plausibility standard on policy 
concerns, it nonetheless noted that the new standard would have 
significant practical ramifications for civil litigation in the federal 
courts.70  As the Court observed, increasing judicial scrutiny at the 
pleading stage would eliminate costs that otherwise might be 
needlessly incurred if weak cases proceeded to discovery.  “[W]hen 
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of 
entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at 
the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties 
and the court.’”71  Not only would more stringent scrutiny at the 
pleading stage eliminate such unwarranted costs, but it also would 
reduce the potential that unwarranted settlements may be extracted 
 
also id. at 577 (arguing that the Conley language “has been cited as authority in a dozen 
opinions of this Court”). 
69 Id. at 562 (majority opinion) (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 
1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42–43 
(6th Cir. 1988); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); 
O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
70 The dissent likewise noted that the Twombly decision would accomplish a significant 
change.  According to the dissent, “[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal 
Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.  The merits 
of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, 
through the crucible of trial.”  Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The “case management” 
procedures the dissent cited included: Rule 12(e)’s mechanism for requiring a plaintiff to 
provide a more definite statement of claims; Rule 7(a)’s authorization for courts to require 
a plaintiff to reply to a defendant’s answer; Rule 23’s requirements for “rigorous analysis” 
of class allegations; Rule 26’s directive to control the scope and sequence of discovery to 
prevent “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”; and Rule 
16’s authorization of significant judicial involvement in pretrial proceedings through 
pretrial conferences and scheduling orders that address “the necessity or desirability of 
amendments to the pleadings,” “the control and scheduling of discovery,” and “the need 
for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that 
may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof 
problems.”  Id. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 558 (majority opinion) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233–34 (3d ed. 2004)). 
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due to the in terrorem effects of litigation.  Thus, the Court 
recognized that the plausibility standard would play an important role 
in increasing the efficiency of civil litigation. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court rejected the policy arguments 
in favor of lax scrutiny at the pleading stage.72  For example, the 
majority expressly rejected the notion that active management of 
discovery could remedy any alleged problems that might occur if 
weaker cases were allowed to proceed beyond the pleading stage.73  
As the Court observed, such remedies were an imperfect substitute for 
increased judicial scrutiny of the pleadings at the outset of a case.  
Among other problems, trial judges may not be in a position at that 
stage in the proceedings to ascertain which discovery would be 
appropriate and which discovery would be inefficient.  Moreover, 
judges are inherently disadvantaged in trying to make such 
determinations because “[t]he judicial officer always knows less than 
the parties, and the parties themselves may not know very well where 
they are going or what they expect to find.”74  Accordingly, the 
majority concluded that active case management to “trim back 
excessive [discovery] demands” was “doomed to be[] hollow”: “We 
cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we 
cannot define; we cannot define ‘abusive’ discovery except in theory, 
because in practice we lack essential information.”75 
The majority likewise concluded that engaging in “phased” 
discovery would not provide an adequate remedy.  Such a procedure 
 
72 For example, while the dissent conceded that antitrust litigation could be 
“enormously expensive” and that “there is a risk that jurors may mistakenly conclude that 
evidence of parallel conduct has proved that the parties acted pursuant to an agreement 
when they in fact merely made similar independent decisions,” its solution was “careful 
case management,” which would include limitations on discovery, scrutiny of the evidence 
at the summary judgment stage, and “lucid instructions to juries.”  Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
73 Id. at 559 (majority opinion) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)). 
74 Id. at 560 n.6 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 638) (observing that “‘[a] 
magistrate supervising discovery does not—cannot—know the expected productivity of a 
given request, because the nature of the requester’s claim and the contents of the files (or 
head) of the adverse party are unknown.’”). 
75 Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 638–39.  In contrast, the dissent believed that such 
measures would be effective.  It acknowledged that plaintiffs should not be “permitted . . . 
to engage in massive discovery based solely on the allegations in this complaint.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that case 
management provided the solution and that “[t]he potential for ‘sprawling, costly, and 
hugely time-consuming’ discovery . . . is no reason to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater.”  Id. at 593 n.13 (citation omitted). 
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suffers from the same problem: lack of judicial knowledge and 
competence to make efficient determinations.  In addition, phased 
discovery does not reduce the costs associated with the initial “phase” 
of discovery, which may, in a complex case, prove “hugely time-
consuming” and costly.76 
Finally, the majority noted that summary judgment could not 
provide an effective remedy.  Almost by definition, the costs of 
discovery must be incurred before the defendant can utilize this 
procedure.  Moreover, the plaintiff can attempt to require the 
imposition of such costs by postponing a ruling until discovery is 
completed on the ground that discovery is needed in order to oppose 
the motion.77  Accordingly, the majority concluded that the summary 
judgment procedure could not prevent potential discovery costs from 
“push[ing] cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.”78  
The Court found that there simply was no viable alternative to judicial 
scrutiny at the pleading stage. 
3.  The Meaning of “Plausibility” 
What was the Court attempting to accomplish with the plausibility 
standard?  At bottom, it appears that the Court sought to embody 
basic principles of logical coherence in pleading decisions.79  Under 
the new test, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, if 
taken as true, would be both necessary and sufficient to establish 
liability.  The principle the Court sought to establish by emphasizing 
that plaintiffs must move beyond mere equanimity between liability 
and nonliability closely matches the requirement of logical necessity 
and sufficiency. 
Viewed in this light, the majority’s decision is not particularly 
surprising.  The Federal Rules could not be interpreted in a way that 
would allow a plaintiff to assert logically defective claims.  Imposing 
such basic requirements is thus in large part simply consistent with 
common sense.  Moreover, such a requirement flows directly from the 
text of Rule 8, which requires that plaintiffs make a “showing” that 
they are entitled to relief.  In order to make the “showing” required 
under Rule 8, plaintiffs must demonstrate that liability is a necessary 
consequence of the allegations in their complaint. 
 
76 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6. 
77 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
78 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
79 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1088–89. 
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The plausibility test is also consistent with the idea of notice 
pleading.80  Absent logically coherent allegations, it is difficult to see 
how a defendant can be put on “notice” regarding the substance of a 
plaintiff’s claims.  Thus, while the dissent in Twombly maintained that 
the plausibility standard was somehow inconsistent with notice 
pleading, in reality, it is merely a logical extension of the notice 
requirement. 
4.  Iqbal’s Gloss on Plausibility 
What contribution did Iqbal make to this formulation?  
Undoubtedly, the Court in Iqbal strengthened the plausibility 
standard.81  As the dissent in Iqbal observed, the majority provided 
additional guidance that went beyond the formulation in Twombly.82  
Specifically, it provided a more fulsome explanation of Twombly’s 
directive that complaints must proceed beyond equanimity between 
liability and nonliability to actually establish the liability of the 
defendant, if all of the allegations are taken as true.  In articulating 
this principle, the majority in Iqbal explained that a plaintiff must 
make allegations that are more “probable” than alternative 
explanations that would not result in the defendant’s liability.83 
Thus, for example, in Twombly the Court distinguished between 
parallel conduct among competitors that was perfectly legal and 
appropriate, and coordinated conduct among competitors that 
constituted a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.  The Twombly majority found that plaintiffs’ 
allegations were inadequate because the allegations were fully 
 
80 See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
plausibility requirement “inform[s] the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim 
against them”); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the 
requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the ‘grounds’ on which 
the claim rests.”). 
81 Some courts had specifically called for additional clarification of the plausibility 
standard.  See, e.g., Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (“The most difficult question in interpreting 
Twombly is what the Court means by ‘plausibility.’”); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230 (“What 
makes Twombly’s impact on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard initially so confusing is that it 
introduces a new ‘plausibility’ paradigm for evaluating the sufficiency of complaints.”); 
see also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. 
L. REV. 535, 547 (“The courts of appeals have struggled to determine Twombly’s precise 
meaning and scope of application, and their efforts have resulted in different 
approaches.”). 
82 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
83 See id. at 1951–52 (majority opinion). 
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consistent with the alternative explanation of independent, parallel 
conduct.  In other words, the plaintiffs’ allegations, if taken as true, 
did not make it more probable that the conduct constituted a 
coordinated anticompetitive conspiracy.  They showed only a state of 
affairs that was consistent with the defendants’ violation of the 
Sherman Act.  Plaintiffs therefore failed to “nudge” their allegations 
from mere equanimity between liability and nonliability to establish 
defendants’ liability. 
The same was true in Iqbal where the majority concluded that the 
plaintiff had failed to make allegations that, if accepted as true, 
established defendants’ liability.  As the majority observed, there was 
more than one possible explanation for the detainment policies cited 
in plaintiff’s complaint.  The first possibility, which plaintiff alleged, 
was that the policies were the result of intentional discrimination.  
The second possibility, however, was that the policies were designed 
to detain individuals who were both breaking the law by being in the 
country illegally and might have ties to terrorists responsible for the 
September 11 attacks.  The majority found that the allegations in the 
complaint did not sufficiently nudge the complaint away from this 
perfectly permissible alternative explanation.  In other words, the 
allegations were merely consistent with liability.  Thus, while the 
analysis provided in Iqbal surely finds its roots in Twombly, as the 
dissent observed, Iqbal strengthened and elaborated upon this 
requirement in a manner that certainly went beyond Twombly.84 
B.  “Conclusory” Allegations 
The Court in Twombly did not discuss at length the requirement 
under Rule 8(a) that allegations not be “conclusory.”  While the 
plaintiffs in Twombly had asserted that there was an antitrust 
conspiracy among defendants, and thus the Court necessarily had to 
dispense with this allegation,85 the Court did so without elaborating 
 
84 See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing that 
“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied 
to federal complaints before Twombly”). 
85 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1950 (observing that “[h]ad the [Twombly] Court simply credited the allegation of a 
conspiracy, the plaintiffs would have stated a claim for relief and been entitled to proceed 
perforce”). 
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on the general requirements necessary to avoid the “conclusory” 
label.  This is where the Court in Iqbal made its major contribution.86 
1.  Origins in Twombly 
In Twombly, the majority noted generally that a pleading that offers 
only “labels and conclusions” or the “formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action” is insufficient.87  Moreover, in a 
footnote, the majority expressly distinguished between allegations 
that were “conclusory” and those that were “factual” in nature.88  In 
doing so, the majority suggested that “conclusory” allegations were 
deficient because they could not be credited as “factual.”89  
Accordingly, such allegations had to be excluded from any 
plausibility analysis, which was a separate and distinct analysis that 
focused on the distinction between “factually neutral” allegations and 
“factually suggestive” allegations.90 
As the Court in Twombly observed, each of these dividing lines 
“must be crossed to enter the realm of plausible.”91  The first line 
divided claims that were essentially legal assertions from those that 
were factual allegations.  The factual allegation category then was 
subdivided into two subsets: “factually neutral” allegations and 
“factually suggestive” allegations.  Only the latter were sufficient to 
satisfy the pleading requirements under Rule 8(a).  Accordingly, the 
Court explained that under the plausibility test, plaintiffs must nudge 
“their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order to 
avoid dismissal of their complaints.92 
2.  Iqbal’s Completion 
The Court in Iqbal elaborated on the first requirement—i.e., that 
allegations be nonconclusory.  In the process, it provided further 
guidance regarding when allegations were so conclusory that they 
 
86 See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Iqbal extends the 
reach of Twombly, instructing that all civil complaints must contain ‘more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’”). 
87 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
88 Id. at 557 n.5. 
89 Id. at 557. 
90 Id. at 557 n.5. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 570. 
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were “not entitled to the assumption of truth,”93 which was the 
“beginning” of the Court’s Rule 8 analysis: 
 We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the 
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  
Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh 
conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account 
of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest.”  The complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the 
“principal architect” of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was 
“instrumental” in adopting and executing it.  These bare assertions, 
much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to 
nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a 
constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted 
a policy “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.”  As such, the allegations are conclusory 
and not entitled to be assumed true.94 
Under this prong of the analysis, the Court distinguished between 
allegations that were “extravagantly fanciful in nature” and those that 
were conclusory, making clear that it was not “reject[ing] these bald 
allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.”95  
Rather, the problem with the allegations was that they were mere 
conclusions that were not “supported by factual allegations.”96 
While the dissent seemed to criticize the majority’s application of 
this principle, it did not dispute it.  Indeed, the principle appears to 
flow directly from Twombly’s footnote distinguishing “conclusory” 
allegations from those that are “factual.”97  Moreover, it is clear that 
under Rule 8, there must be a prohibition against conclusory 
allegations—indeed, such a prohibition is consistent with a long line 
of judicial interpretation.98  At bottom, a contrary interpretation 
would simply make no sense.  If plaintiffs could simply rely upon 
assertions regarding elements of their claims, then every case could 
proceed beyond the pleading stage. 
The drafters of Rule 8 plainly contemplated no such result, as is 
evidenced by the Rule’s requirement that plaintiffs make a “showing” 
 
93 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). 
94 Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1950. 
97 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5. 
98 See, e.g., Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 1990); Munz v. Parr, 758 
F.2d 1254, 1259 (8th Cir. 1985); Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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that they are entitled to relief.99  Conclusory allegations cannot 
constitute such a “showing.”  Nor could such allegations put a 
defendant on “notice” of a plaintiff’s claims.  Thus, conclusory 
allegations must be disregarded under the plain language of Rule 8. 
III 
IQBAL’S STRONG REPUDIATION OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT TWOMBLY 
The Iqbal decision is significant not only because it went beyond 
Twombly in articulating the requirements plaintiffs must meet at the 
pleading stage, but also because it rejected across-the-board attempts 
to impose limits on the Twombly decision.  Shortly after Twombly was 
decided, several commentators and some judges suggested potential 
limitations on the decision.100  Indeed, the Second Circuit’s “context-
based” analysis adopted one of these supposed limitations.  The 
majority in Iqbal rejected such limitations in favor of a broad reading 
of Twombly that made clear that the plausibility rule it articulated was 
one of general application. 
A.  The Alleged Antitrust Limitation 
Almost immediately after the Twombly decision, some 
commentators and certain judges focused on the fact that the decision 
addressed antitrust claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.101  
They observed that the majority in Twombly had specifically cited the 
costs associated with discovery in the antitrust context as a reason that 
a heightened pleading standard was warranted, and accordingly 
argued that Twombly should not be applied outside that context.102 
 
99 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to 
relief.  A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”). 
100 See Bone, supra note 5, at 880 (“Twombly triggered a sharp response from the 
academic community almost immediately, most of it criticizing the Court for tightening up 
on pleading requirements.”). 
101 See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (explaining that Twombly was 
limited to antitrust and “did not rework pleading rules across the board,” but recognizing 
that courts had not adopted this interpretation); Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to 
the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 438 n.38 (2007) (maintaining that it is “not clear” 
whether Twombly “is really just about pleading in antitrust cases”); The Supreme Court, 
2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 310 n.51 (2007) [hereinafter 
Leading Cases] (“Some scholars view Twombly as primarily an antitrust case.”). 
102 See Bradley, supra note 101, at 117 (arguing that “plausibility” is “antitrust jargon”). 
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The majority in Iqbal rejected this assertion.  Pointing to language 
in the Twombly decision, the majority noted that the Court’s “decision 
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’     
. . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”103  As 
the majority observed, the Twombly decision “was based on [the 
Court’s] interpretation and application of Rule 8.”104  Because that 
rule applies to all cases filed in federal courts, regardless of subject 
matter, the Twombly standard likewise is one of general applicability. 
Moreover, the neutrality reflected in this interpretation is an 
important characteristic of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.105  
Applying different rules for different types of cases could lead to 
inefficiencies and make pleading unduly complex.  It could also lead 
to unfairness and results-based judicial decision making.  The Federal 
Rules are intended to be substantively neutral for precisely this 
reason.  Moreover, as Professor Redish has observed, a system of 
federal rules that lacks such neutrality raises significant constitutional 
concerns, as it would in effect raise the prospect of replacing 
substantive law created by representative bodies with the procedural 
decisions of unelected members of the rules committee or the 
judiciary.106 
Even if such limitations could be imposed, however, it is not clear 
that they make sense.  Many of the same concerns justifying stringent 
scrutiny of the pleadings in the context of antitrust cases arise in other 
cases as well.107  Thus, for example, the Twombly majority 
specifically noted the potential for in terrorem litigation in the 
securities context.108  More generally, the costs associated with 
discovery can be significant in a broad range of cases and, indeed, are 
 
103 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Brooks 
v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (Iqbal “clarified that Twombly’s plausibility 
requirement applies across the board, not just to antitrust cases”); Moss v. U.S. Secret 
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Iqbal Court made clear that 
Twombly’s ‘plausibility standard’ applies to pleadings in civil actions generally, rejecting 
the plaintiff’s suggestion that the holding be limited to the antitrust context.”). 
104 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
105 Smith, supra note 8, at 1082. 
106 See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 69 (2009) (“[T]he language of the Rules 
Enabling Act codified the reformers’ belief that as long as the judiciary limited its scope to 
‘procedural’ matters and not ‘substantive’ ones, it would not encroach on legislative 
functions”). 
107 See Smith, supra note 8, at 1082. 
108 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007). 
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only increasing with the onset of increased electronic discovery.109  
For these reasons, even the Second Circuit had recognized that 
Twombly could not be limited to the antitrust context.110  Nor did the 
dissent in Iqbal assert otherwise.  To the contrary, the dissent 
expressly stated that Twombly applied generally but argued that the 
majority had “misapplie[d] the pleading standard” the Court had 
previously articulated.111  Thus, there was uniform rejection of this 
proposed limitation on Twombly. 
B.  The Alleged Complex Case Limitation 
The Second Circuit, however, did seem to adopt a second and 
related limitation of Twombly—that it was limited to “complex” cases 
or cases in which the costs of discovery were likely to be 
significant.112  Again, this interpretation of Twombly focused on the 
Court’s discussion of discovery costs rather than its discussion of the 
plain language of Rule 8.113  As such, it represents a misguided 
attempt to limit the scope of the Court’s decision. 
The majority in Iqbal rejected this proposed limitation, disputing 
the notion that the “construction of Rule 8 should be tempered where, 
as here, the Court of Appeals has ‘instructed the district court to cabin 
discovery in such a way as to preserve’ petitioners’ defense of 
qualified immunity ‘as much as possible in anticipation of a summary 
judgment motion.’”114  As the Iqbal Court observed, in Twombly it 
had specifically held “that the question presented by a motion to 
 
109 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 590 (2001).  But see Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 887 (arguing that “the 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules on e-discovery . . . provide federal judges ample 
authority to rein in potentially expensive e-discovery”). 
110 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). 
111 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
112 See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–58; see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 
(10th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that “[t]he Twombly standard may have greater bite” in cases 
involving “complex claims against multiple defendants”). 
113 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157; see also Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with 
Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial 
Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1237–38 (2008) (“[S]ome have suggested 
that perhaps one way to read the decision in Twombly is to regard it as an effort by the 
Court to impose heightened judicial scrutiny over pleadings but, simultaneously, to try to 
corral the extent of the decision’s reach by pegging the need for heightened judicial 
scrutiny to the risk of exorbitant discovery costs.”). 
114 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion [in Iqbal] makes clear that the Twombly 
‘facial plausibility’ pleading requirement applies to all civil suits in the federal courts.”). 
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dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the 
controls placed upon the discovery process.”115  This conclusion 
flowed directly from the analytical basis for the Court’s ruling, which 
was the text of Rule 8—a rule of general application that applies to all 
cases filed in federal courts. 
Again, it is significant that this analysis went largely unchallenged 
by the dissent, which did not even purport to argue that limitations on 
discovery rendered Twombly inapplicable.  Rather, the dissent 
dutifully applied the Court’s prior decision, suggesting only that it 
dictated a result contrary to that reached by the majority.  Only Justice 
Breyer, in a separate dissenting opinion joined by no other members 
of the Court, raised the issue of discovery at all, suggesting not that 
Twombly was limited to particular cases, but rather that trial courts 
had “other legal weapons designed to prevent unwarranted 
interference” with the performance of official government functions: 
As the Second Circuit explained, where a Government defendant 
asserts a qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for 
managing a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose 
of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways 
that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public 
officials. . . . A district court, for example, can begin discovery with 
lower level government defendants before determining whether a 
case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level 
government officials. . . . Neither the briefs nor the Court’s opinion 
provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-
management tools inadequate, either in general or in the case before 
us.116 
Thus, once again, both the majority and dissent declined to limit the 
general rule articulated in Twombly. 
C.  Resolution of Questions Regarding the Court’s Commitment to 
Twombly 
The Iqbal Court also implicitly put to rest arguments based on 
subsequent decisions.  For example, the Second Circuit and some 
commentators had latched onto the fact that almost immediately after 
issuing Twombly the Supreme Court had restated the general notice 
 
115 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 
(2007)); see also id. at 1954 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, 
he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”). 
116 Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158). 
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requirement in Erickson v. Pardus.117  However, in Erickson, the 
Court simply asserted that 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”  Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.’”118 
There is nothing inconsistent with this statement and the decision in 
Twombly, which expressly stated that its interpretation of Rule 8 was 
not inconsistent with the concept of “notice” pleading.119 
While the Court in Iqbal did not expressly address this argument, 
its decision implicitly resolved the question by strongly reaffirming 
Twombly and making clear that it applied to all cases filed in the 
federal courts.120  Likewise, the dissent’s failure to make any mention 
of this supposed limitation raised by the Second Circuit underscores 
that even the dissenters did not believe that Erickson signaled a 
limitation on the Twombly ruling in any way. 
In sum, the fact that the Court in Iqbal rejected all of these 
proposed limitations on Twombly is significant.  The Court sent a 
strong signal that pleadings filed in federal court should be given 
significant scrutiny at the outset of litigation, a result that is 
compelled by the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well 
as sound notions of policy.  The Iqbal and Twombly decisions are thus 
 
117 See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157 (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)); see also, 
e.g., Bradley, supra note 101, at 122 (arguing that in Erickson, “the Court allowed a 
complaint based only on scant allegations”); Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 890 (arguing that 
Twombly and Erickson are “inconsistent”); Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 438 n.38 
(noting that in Erickson, the Court “reaffirmed traditional rules of notice pleading”); 
Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 310 n.51 (“Several commentators have argued that 
Erickson shows that Twombly should be read less expansively than some have 
suggested.”).  Even after Iqbal, some courts have cited Erickson.  See, e.g., Brooks v. 
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). 
118 Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (omission in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544). 
119 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3, 557, 569 n.14. 
120 Even before Iqbal, courts and commentators rejected this argument.  See, e.g., 
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (“We do not read Erickson to 
undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain ‘more than labels and 
conclusions.’ . . .”); see also Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 140 (2007) (“Erickson reaffirmed Bell 
Atlantic’s requirement that the complaint provide notice plus grounds. . . . The two cases 
are looking at the same standard . . . .”); Spencer, supra note 2, at 456 (maintaining that 
while Erickson may “soften the edges of Twombly, seeming to assure readers that not all 
of Conley’s legacy has been discarded,” its “homage to notice pleading and the liberal 
ethos ring hollow”). 
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likely to have a significant effect on both the rate at which cases are 
dismissed in the federal courts and also the level of factual detail 
contained in the initial pleadings.  The outcome of these effects is 
likely to be increased efficiency.121  Dispensing with legally invalid 
claims obviously will conserve scarce judicial resources.  However, 
even where cases proceed, to the extent claims are defined at the 
outset of the litigation, courts can better determine which claims can 
proceed and which do not merit further attention.  The time and effort 
of both the courts and the parties are therefore less likely to be 
wasted. 
CONCLUSION 
What will the future bring under Twombly and Iqbal?  This is a 
question that the federal courts must address.  However, it is already 
clear that the level of judicial scrutiny given at the pleading stage is 
likely to increase.  The Supreme Court has sent a strong signal with 
these twin decisions that plaintiffs must plead sufficient factual details 
such that a logically coherent theory emerges that is more than merely 
“consistent with” the defendant’s liability. 
Not only the text of Rule 8, but also the Federal Rules as a whole 
and the policies they embody, support the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation.  Modern civil litigation has taken on a life of its own 
and threatens to spiral out of control without some judicial 
involvement early in the proceedings to weed out weak or frivolous 
claims.  These concerns have only escalated in recent years with the 
increases in costs associated with discovery.  Electronic discovery 
alone has imposed significant burdens on defendants that should not 
be borne in cases in which plaintiffs are unable to come up with a 
coherent theory as to defendants’ liability.122 
The Supreme Court has not turned a deaf ear to these concerns.  
While Twombly and Iqbal are firmly rooted in the text of the Federal 
Rules, the Court’s extensive discussion of the policy implications of 
its decisions, as well as the interplay among the various rules, 
underscores that it is not oblivious to such considerations.  Indeed, 
 
121 See Bone, supra note 5, at 890–91 (arguing that Twombly is consistent with the 
“procedural vision of the Federal Rule drafters” who had “a pragmatic commitment to 
making procedure an efficient means to enforce the substantive law accurately”). 
122 See Redish, supra note 109, at 581 (“[T]he costs and burdens that result from [the] 
difficulties [associated with electronic discovery] can be of such a magnitude as to have a 
profound and unpredictable impact on basic societal choices not directly involving the 
lawsuit.”). 
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Twombly and Iqbal may be viewed as the culmination of a string of 
decisions in which the Court has recognized that the judiciary plays a 
valuable role in acting as a gatekeeper to the federal courts.123  While 
the judiciary should not block the door to the trial of meritorious 
claims, it can serve a useful screening function at the outset of the 
litigation.  Moreover, this role cannot be supplanted by other means 
of case management.124 
The Court’s decisions, which strengthen and define the standards 
under Rule 8(a), effectively target those claims with little or no merit 
while not disadvantaging those with merit.  In this regard, the Court’s 
decisions are likely to have a salient effect.  Weak and unsupported 
claims will be discouraged.  Plaintiffs will have an incentive to 
include factual allegations to support their legal claims in the body of 
the complaint.  And this early definition of plaintiffs’ contentions is 
likely to further streamline those cases that survive judicial scrutiny at 
the pleading stage.  In sum, the more defined the claims are at the 
outset of the litigation, the more efficient that litigation is likely to be. 
 
123 For example, before Twombly, the Court had previously “alluded to the practical 
significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo,” a securities case in which the court strengthened the requirements for pleading 
loss causation.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–58 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336 (2005)).  There, the Court “explained that something beyond the mere possibility 
of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be 
allowed to ‘take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so 
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.’”  Id.  (quoting Dura 
Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347).  Likewise, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
551 U.S. 308 (2007), the Court had tightened the standard for pleading a “strong inference 
of scienter” under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA).  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
majority, held that “[i]t does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer 
from the complaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind.”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.  
Instead, “a court . . . must consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff, . . . but also 
competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged.”  Id.  In so ruling, the 
majority observed that “[p]rivate securities fraud actions, . . . if not adequately contained, 
can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals 
whose conduct conforms to the law.”  Id. at 313 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)). 
124 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–60, 560 n.6 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 638–
39). 
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